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TRAC E-Bulletin #07-19

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Type Meeting Report

Source Alan C. Miller, TRAC Executive Director

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TRAC Members & Associates--

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An excellent video was produced recently that touts the benefits of California High-Speed Rail.  The video captures the nature of California's future transportation needs and presents visuals that lead the viewer to feel HSR is necessary and doable in California.  It was unveiled at the meeting, and you can view it on the home-page of the CHSRA website at:

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http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/

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The Friday Meeting of the High-Speed Rail Authority was significant in that it presented the first release of preliminary operating and ridership numbers regarding the route for Bay Area access from the Central Valley.  In this report there is space only for highlights from the nearly five hour meeting.  The routes were modeled by the CHSRA's consultants and the following times for Altamont (ALT) & Pacheco (PCH) Routes were reported:

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LA-SF

PCH     2:38

ALT     2:36

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LA-SJ

PCH     2:09

ALT     2:19

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SF-SAC

PCH     1:47

ALT     1:06

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SJ-SAC

PCH     1:18

ALT     0:49

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Altamont would cost $12.7 b to build, Pacheco $12.4 b; if all three termini are served, Altamont would cost $16b, Pacheco $15.4b.  If the line were to terminate in San Jose only and use regional systems to connect to the rest of the Bay Area, either line would cost about $8b.  Pacheco is longer but cheaper per mile due in part to less urbanization.

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From late 2003 to late 2006 there has been a 17% increase in the cost of building the lines due to inflation (including land and construction costs).  Specifically for Altamont, the high-bridge alternative cost estimate has gone from $300 million in 1998 to $1.1 to $1.4 billion in 2007.  Routing decisions by the CHSRA have increased the cost of an Altamont alternative today over that analyzed in the late 90's.  These include using 880 over the Mulford line in the East Bay ($300m increase) and going through Central Valley towns on/near existing railroad lines rather than using the West of 99 alternative (roughly $200m increase).

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Director Diridon complained that a cost comparison estimate shown for Pacheco should not include a line to Stockton as was shown.  This slide was explained by the consultant to be for modeling purposes only.  After extended debate, Executive Director Morshed cautioned directors to refrain from attempting to engineer the routing decisions at this point in the process.

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Ridership figures were a bit less cut and dry than the time estimates.   A new ridership model was designed that was touted as being innovative and useful for many future projects.  Included in the new model and not in the old was people driving in from remote areas to use HSR, as well as more sophisticated modeling for transferring between modes.  For example revenues were estimated to be 3% higher for one route over the other in a "base line" model, and 3% the other way for a "high end" model (which assumed higher fuel costs).  So basically a wash.

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Staging was discussed.  The board can choose to stage based on geographic balance, on the fastest completion of a segment or starter line, or on a route that would attract an optimal funding model.  The bottom line is building a starter line that would yield a positive operating cash flow that would prove the worth of high-speed rail and attract private dollars to build additional segments.

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The draft EIR/EIS is not complete. These numbers are preliminary and subject to revision.  Reports will be posted soon on the CHSRA website.

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-- 

Alan C. Miller
Executive Director
Train Riders Association of California

Official TRAC Website:  http://www.trainriders.org/

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